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Abstract
This paper examines how the degree of gender-egalitarianism embedded in inheritance
rules impacts state capacity at its early stages during medieval times. We present a theoretical
model in which building state capacity enables nobles to raise taxes and overcome rivals.
The model addresses the use of inheritance to consolidate landholding dynasties, also
accommodating inter-state marriages between landed heirs. On the one hand, dynastic
continuity —of utmost importance to medieval lords— directly encourages state-building.
Male-biased inheritance rules historically maximise the likelihood of dynastic continuity. We
weigh this effect against the indirect impact of the more frequent land-merging marriages
under gender-egalitarian rules. Contrary to the literature, our results suggest that gender-
egalitarian norms —offering a low probability of dynastic continuity— promote state capacity
in the short run more than gender-biased norms. In the long run results are reversed,
providing a rationale for the pervasive European tradition of preference for men as heirs.
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1 Introduction
Well-functioning states are the result of centuries of continuous improvements in state capacity.
The economic literature documents a clear relationship between state capacity and economic
development, with the former providing property rights, judicial systems and market-supporting
institutions: Bockstette et al. (2002), Besley (2011), Fukuyama (2012). In particular, longer
histories of state-level institutions are linked to economic prosperity in Chanda and Putterman
(2007), Dincecco and Katz (2014) and Borcan et al. (2017).
Our theoretical paper is concerned with the process of building state capacity in its early
stages, focusing on the resurgence of state centralisation in the European context during
medieval times. The nascent states then replacing the Roman Empire invested in state capacity
to provide security and defence against neighbours. In the economic literature, state capacity is
usually expanded to overcome rivals and control resources. We examine this initial process of
state-building, focusing on a neglected institutional factor: the degree of gender-egalitarianism
embedded in inheritance rules. In doing so, we illustrate how gender equality may have impacted
the process of state creation and, indirectly, affected economic prosperity, complementing the
literature on state formation. However, this paper does not attempt to rationalise how modern
states build state capacity. Specifically, we analyse how state capacity evolves under two different
norms in the context of medieval Europe. We compare male-preference cognatic primogeniture,
a norm that grants men preferential access to inheritance, with absolute primogeniture, a norm
that treats genders alike. The choice of a particular rule is likely to be endogenous and possibly
related to how women are perceived in a society. However, this paper exogenously fixes norms to
compare their outcomes. Under the male-preference rule, a woman can only inherit if she has no
living brothers. In contrast, absolute primogeniture selects the oldest sibling as heir, regardless
of gender.
We introduce the concept of dynastic continuity, where landholdings are related to a family
name for generations. A long-lasting system of identification was actively sought by European
elites during the middle ages, as we detail later. As fiefs descend through inheritance, a member
of the elite who expects his dynasty to continue will devote more resources to state capacity
because its benefits remain attached to his family name. Male-biased inheritance rules incentivise
state-building: historically, men ensured highly-valued dynastic continuity.1 In addition to this,
1The gender privileged by a given inheritance rule is irrelevant in our model. What is important is that both
dynasties and landholdings descend through the same gender. However, we acknowledge historic customs.
2
our model accommodates inter-state marriages between land-inheriting heirs. These marriages
lead to the accumulation of land, generating a wealth effect. We weigh the direct effect of more
likely dynastic continuity under gender-biased norms against the wealth effect, more salient
under gender-neutral rules.
Our model thus captures the incentive to build state capacity for land-based countries,
as rulers sought territorial expansion to increase the prestige and influence of their dynasties.
Although small and well-organised states did not territorially expand until late, their lords
engaged in internal battles for control. Considering marriages intended to merge wealth and
political power as well broadens the scope of our model and encompasses such cases, as Appendix
E illustrates.
We find that state capacity accumulates faster under gender-egalitarian rules in the short
run. This novel result revises the literature and indicates that fast wealth accumulation can
make up for lower probability of dynastic continuity. Nonetheless, in the long run results are
reversed. The differing rate of inter-state marriages between inheritance rules explains our
results. In particular, wealth accumulation through marriages is delayed under gender-biased
norms, as this system naturally generates less marriages. However, the total number of possible
marriages is fixed, and eventually both systems converge towards the same distribution of wealth.
After wealth differences vanish, the direct effect of a higher probability of dynastic continuity
dominates, delivering the higher levels of state capacity typically found in the economic literature.
Moreover, this last result provides a rationale —beyond short-term considerations regarding
dynastic continuity— for the pervasive prevalence of male-preference cognatic primogeniture
in the European context. Finally, although our model principally addresses the evolution of
state capacity, we conclude that gender equality may have had major indirect consequences on
economic development through state capacity building.2
2 Related literature and historical context
State capacity and its determinants. The concept of state capacity refers to and measures
a state’s capacity to obtain compliance from individuals, and how far-reaching this ability is.
McAdam et al. (2001, p. 78) define it as “the degree of control state agents exercise over persons,
2Contrary to our findings, increasing levels of gender equality, broadly understood, induce economic growth in
a pre-modern set-up, see Lagerlo¨f (2003). Insofar as state capacity is conducive to economic prosperity, our model
indicates that gender discrimination, at least in some specific domains such as inheritance rules and for critical
junctures, may be growth-enhancing.
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activities, and resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction”. Ottervik’s (2013)
definition is similar and enumerates indicators of state capacity.3 Among these, tax collection
stands out because an “effective political system should be able to extract resources, aggregate
them, and use them for national purposes” (Walder (1995, p. 90-91)).
In the economic literature, conflict promotes state capacity because it enhances tax collection
efficiency, thereby increasing the likelihood of victory. This relationship lies at the core of
theoretical state-building models, which typically oppose two agents.4 For example, state-
building and tax collection respond to external threats in Besley and Persson (2008). Dincecco
and Katz (2014) empirically validate the hypothesis that centralised states are more efficient
at levying taxes than fragmented states, and Besley and Persson (2009) confirm that a longer
history of belligerency is correlated with state capacity. Our model uses conflict as a driver,
since rulers wage war to control resources.5 However, we arbitrarily extend the set of contenders.
Furthermore, in line with the historical development of state capacity, in our model the Lords’
budget constraint dynamically changes, reflecting the outcome of the war in preceding periods.
Thus, we better capture the inceptive for waging war: controlling the neighbours’ land and
resources.
The literature also emphasises that political stability —the probability of continued rule—
fosters state capacity building. Typically, it introduces opposing groups that can alternate
in power and make transfers to their people. Building state capacity increases tax collection
efficiency and, therefore, potential transfers to the group in power in subsequent periods, see
Besley and Persson (2008) and Besley and Persson (2009). Besley et al. (2013) find some
empirical support for this hypothesis. We extend this concept by incorporating the idea of
dynastic continuity and, consistent with the literature, find that it increases investments in
state capacity. However, the literature suggests a one-to-one mapping between the probability
of continued rule and state-building at odds with actual inheritance practices.6 In fact, male-
preference cognatic primogeniture permits dynastic extinction: when the issue consists of only
daughters, the dynasty disappears and the son-in-law takes control of the landholdings. Insofar
3His definition reads “the ability of the state to [...] coax compliant behaviour from the individuals”.
4The role of state capacity as a lever to increase tax revenue to fund armies was early acknowledged by Bean
(1973), Tilly et al. (1985) and Bonney (1999, p. 9).
5Fighting for the control of scarce resources impacts other outcomes: fertility levels, with fatal consequences,
in de la Croix and Dottori (2008) and education expenditure in Aghion et al. (2018). Economic development and
industrialisation stifle war-making in Lagerlo¨f (2010), as industry reduces the need for land.
6Complete female discrimination would imply choosing a brother or nephew as heir, who might change
surname to continue the dynasty.
4
inter-state marriages generate a wealth effect that boosts state capacity building, our research
suggests that a reduction in the probability of dynastic continuity may present a dynamic
advantage. In particular, allowing women to inherit opens the possibility of marrying a son to
an heiress, thereby increasing family landholdings. In that sense, a sufficiently low, but positive,
probability of feminine inheritance may maximise the expected landholdings of a dynasty.
Other determinants of state capacity identified in Besley and Persson (2009) include the
country’s wealth, the demand for public goods and political representativeness.7 Johnson and
Koyama (2014) further argue that greater homogeneity allowed England to move away from cabal
tax farming before France, while Gennaioli and Voth (2015) model how regional cohesiveness
facilitates centralisation. Finally, Johnson and Koyama (2017) review historical determinants of
state capacity.
European medieval context. The collapse of the Roman Empire, once a powerful unified
entity, generated a plethora of regional polities seeking to expand militarily at the expense of
others, as larger domains provided more income and accrued greater political influence and
prestige.8 According to Smith (1776), power and greatness depended on estate size, which
explains the prevalence among elites of primogeniture, a system that keeps landholdings intact.9
Male-preference cognatic primogeniture ensures dynastic continuity by linking a surname to
landholdings, something which in the medieval context was of the utmost importance,10 even to
the extent of disqualifying direct family members as heirs. Spring (1993) note that landowners
used male-preference cognatic primogeniture to maintain a family’s relationship to the land,
contrary to common-law requirements.11 Historical accounts show that testators preferred to
bequeath to an outsider or a distant relative rather than face dynastic extinction. In such
cases, wills made clear provisions for the continuation of the family name. For instance, Robert
Marmyon specified his heir should “take the name Marmyon” to avoid “extinction [...] and to
ensure that its estates would continue in the name of Marmyon”, see (Payling, 1992, p. 34).12
7Persson and Tabellini (2004) document that more representative parliamentary and proportional democracies
achieve higher state capacity when measured by government spending.
8Girouard (1978) details additional advantages.
9Kokkonen and Sundell (2014) find that countries where primogeniture was the inheritance system developed
more, both in the past and in the present, than those that elected their ruler or applied agnatic seniority.
Primogeniture avoided conflict because it clearly designated a young heir, delivering stability.
10Debris (2005, p. 29) writes that “the risk of dynastic extinction was not to be taken lightly [...] because
perpetuity was the [...] condition for the development of dynastic power”, own translation from French.
11French Basques also circumvented the law to stick to primogeniture, see Arrizabalaga (2009). Similarly, the
British fee tail institution aimed at preserving estates intact, see also Gobbi and Gon˜i (2018).
12 Several other accounts support the fear of lineage extinction. Clay (1968) details the case of the Marquess
of Halifax, who disinherited his daughter and demanded that his heir adopt his family name. Payling (2001)
describes a similar case within the Drayton family and notes that others married an heiress to a non-heir son
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In that sense, dynastic preservation took precedence over genetic perpetuation, even though
direct descendants were not left empty-handed and were bypassed only when dynastic continuity
was threatened. Hurwich (1998) notes that the German nobility avoided exogamy even with the
“wealthiest of the urban patriciate” to “maintain and elevate the lineage”. However, the nobility
sought to enlarge their progeny so as to maximise the likelihood of dynastic continuity.13 The
concept of dynastic continuity we introduce reflects this desire to ensure that the family name
is identified with landholdings. Surname transmission is crucial and, to continue a dynasty,
heirship and surnames should descend through the same gender. Appendix A provides additional
historic details regarding the evolution of inheritance rules and the medieval context.
Our model distinguishes between inheritance rules based on whether or not women could
inherit. Historically, European regions systematically favoured men during medieval times,
and the system of male-preference cognatic primogeniture was widely used (Drell (2013)).14
Male-preference cognatic primogeniture only allows a daughter to become heiress if she has no
living brothers. We contrast it with absolute primogeniture, which selects the oldest sibling
regardless of gender.
Male-preference cognatic primogeniture maintained landholdings intact and preserved their
identification with the dynasty because men were favoured.15 Moreover, large estates provided
enough income to fulfil the military obligations of the feudal system, although this made internal
instability costlier.16
This was the case in England for all tenures after Henry I. Western France’s Capetians always
designated one son as heir and Norman dukes traditionally applied primogeniture favouring sons,
according to Patourel (1971) and Jewell (1996, p. 122). Frankish Chamavian, Thuringian and
Lombard codes also prevented women from inheriting land, see Nelson and Rio (2013). Similarly,
while bequeathing to a male relative. Several wills clearly specify that heirs adopt the testator’s family name and
bear arms unchanged, see Cokayne (1887). Hicks (1998, p. 32) summarises the idea simply: “preservation of the
line and the family name really mattered”. Finally, Chu (1991) shows that primogeniture emerges as the optimal
inheritance rule that minimises the risk of lineage extinction, see also references therein.
13 For instance, Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor, reflected at length on remarriage because he had only
one son, see Debris (2005, p. 35). However, it is interesting to observe that genetic perpetuation had its own
limits, as Debris (2005, p. 24-26) illustrates. In particular, the author observes that incumbent lords had high
fertility rates. However, many of these children were forced to remain single, up to 40% of sons in some families,
to “keep fiefdoms together”. Similar figures appear in Hurwich (1998). Appendix A.1 rationalises this behaviour.
14The Visigoths allowed women to inherit if parents died intestate and Burgundian codes favoured sisters over
brothers when nubile girls died, see Drell (2013, p. 10).
15Kotlyar (2018, p. 170) indicates that “preference for males was practically universal in feudal Europe
reflecting the initial origin of fiefs”.
16Inheritances transitioned from partitioned to intact. The model we develop does not consider the former
case, but these were common in Britain before the Norman Conquest, in France under the Carolingians and for a
while in the Holy Roman Empire, see Appendix A.
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Ros (2012) and Piniella del Valle (1986) indicate that Catalonia actively applied male-preference
primogeniture until very recent times. The more stringent Salic Law, completely forbidding
women from inheriting, applied in Salian lands until tempered by King Chilperic’s edict (Herlihy
(1962)). Visigothic tradition also favoured men.17
Inheritance rules and practices evolved over time, and the importance of primogeniture
decreased. In particular, Bertocchi (2006) argues that the prevalence of primogeniture diminishes
as nascent states take over defence provision, replacing individual lords. Primogeniture was
crucial to meeting the costs of private defence by keeping large income-generating domains intact.
Dunbar (2016) reasons similarly.18
Finally, our model introduces the historically common inter-state marriages, see Habakkuk
(1950), Clay (1968) and Girouard (1978). Such marriages increased estate size because heiresses
“brought lands to husband[s]” (Holt (1985), see also Rodrigues (2007) and Debris (2005)),
precluding female dynasties. Including these marriages leads to a wealth effect, whereby larger
polities invest more, as in Lagerlo¨f (2014). However in our model, polity size results from a
unification process acting through both war and marriage.19
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 3 introduces the static part of
the theoretical model. Section 3.1 incorporates the marriage market for land-inheritors which,
together with war, generates the dynamics. We simulate the evolution of state capacity under
both inheritance rules in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
3 The Model
Our model is based on an overlapping generations framework with discrete time. Consider a
region L divided into smaller sub-regions at period t = 0. Each sub-region is a manor, indexed
by i = 1, 2, . . . , It. The size of manors, denoted x
i
t > 0, is normalised such that
∑
i∈Lt x
i
t = 1.
Each manor is ruled by a Lord who lives for two periods and makes decisions when adult. His
17By 1242, German princes embraced estate division. The practice lasted until the Thirty Years War. This
“reckless division” (Cecil (1895)) created more opportunities for war to break out, as well as a potential barrier to
prosperity.
18Gender-biased inheritance rules in favour of men may reflect the military origins of fiefs and the need to
organise their defence. War is a prototypical male activity, and men are in general less risk-averse than women.
This explains the extensive use of inheritance rules that preferentially select men. Moreover, to perpetuate dynastic
continuity, surnames need to descend through the gender most likely to inherit landholdings. We conjecture that
this delicate relationship may explain the joint prevalence of men as surname carriers and men being preferentially
treated in inheritance rules.
19Our model is quite simple regarding regional dynamics and predicts unification. Alesina and Spolaore (1997,
2006) model the optimal number of countries and its relation to state capacity and war.
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preferences are given by:
U it = ln
(
cit
)
+ γ ln
(
xit+1
)
, (1)
where cit > 0 represents consumption during adulthood and x
i
t+1 ∈ (0, 1) the size of the manor his
heir will receive, after the war process but before marriages. Future manor size is discounted by
γ ∈ (0, 1), the probability of dynastic continuity. As we show later, inheritance rules determine
its value. For the moment, with probability 1− γ dynastic continuity ends and the incumbent
Lord derives no utility as his dynasty disappears, losing all prestige and influence. In that
sense, Lords care about the continuation of their dynasty and not about the perpetuation of
genetic material. The utility formulation indicates this clearly, with no value attached to having
surviving offspring.20 Lords are in fact powerless to avoid dynastic extinction and strictly follow
inheritance rules.21 Similarly, a small manor after the war process, captured by xit+1, only
provides limited benefits in terms of prestige. The entire manor and dynasty may even disappear
if the Lord does not invest enough in state capacity and the army.22
Since total area is constant, the size of a manor can increase only at the expense of some
neighbour. Conflict continuously arises because Lords seek to enlarge their estates. We model
conflict through a war process such that, at every period of time, Lords battle all-against-all.23
Lords hire soldiers to battle and their efficiency is increased by state capacity. Following
Skaperdas (1996), the outcome of the war is a new distribution of land:
xit+1 =
(
1 +Ait + g
i
t
)
bit
φ∑
i∈Lt
(
1 +Ait + g
i
t
)
bit
φ
,∀i ∈ Lt, (2)
20Introducing endogenous fertility provides a margin that directly affects the probability of dynastic continuity
under male-preference cognatic primogeniture. Although it may deliver interesting dynamics, the model is no
longer tractable, as it introduces an endogenous discount rate. We refer the reader to Section ?? and Appendix A
for a discussion about the importance of dynastic continuity.
21For the sake of simplicity, the model disregards partitioned inheritances, which consisted in the division of
an estate between siblings. Although historically relevant, the practice was progressively abandoned in favour
of undivided inheritances, in particular primogeniture. Agency problems in managing large estates or marriage
strategies may explain the practice of inheritance division. Furthermore, records indicate that children’s equal value
also induced Lords to divide inheritances, see McNamara and Wemple (1973) and references therein. Introducing
such practices would slow down the dynamics of the model but would not alter the qualitative results. Appendix
A provides more information on the historical evolution of inheritance practices, and on the relationship between
feudal obligations and the practice of primogeniture.
22Other incentives for waging war may be related to fear of annihilation and family destruction and captivity.
The model already accommodates the possibility of annihilation, represented by the extreme case of manor
size going to zero. In particular, Section 3.1 proposes that tiny manors are completely obliterated during war.
Although we do not explicitly model it, family destruction and captivity may be correlated to estate size. For the
sake of simplicity, we abstract from these additional considerations. Historically, Strickland (2001) explains that
during the medieval period knights and lords were typically spared, either for a ransom or out of mercy.
23To accommodate this battle process which does not consider the distance to the battlefield, think of Lt as a
doughnut with manors on its surface and battles taking place in the central hole.
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where bit > 0 is the number of soldiers hired, φ > 0 measures their relative importance in the
war process, Ait represents state capacity during period t and g
i
t indicates the amount invested
in state-building.24 We argue that a more capable state better organises its military because
it has more officials and better internal coordination. To simplify the problem, we assume
that Lords ignore the externality caused by a unilateral increase in the number of soldiers or
in state capacity. This allows analytical results to be derived, at the expense of inconsistent
behaviour when there is only one manor.25 However, the qualitative results —especially during
the transition phase, when multiple manors exist— would not change if we adopted a more
complex approach. Substituting Equation 2 into Equation 1 yields an equivalent expression for
utility:
U it = ln
(
cit
)
+ γ ln
((
1 +Ait + g
i
t
)
bit
φ
)
,∀i ∈ Lt. (3)
A Lord’s income depends on manor size and state capacity. In particular, a homogeneous
final good is produced in each manor, using land alone.26 Total production is shared between
the Lord and the commoners under a crop-sharing agreement.27 We impose constant shares
over time and across manors: the Lord receives ψ ∈ (0, 1) and the remaining 1− ψ goes to the
commoners. Further, the Lords can levy certain taxes on the commoners’ share. In keeping
with the literature, the effective tax rate is given by τ it =
Ait+g
i
t
1+Ait+g
i
t
which increases in line with
state capacity and investments. State capacity does not depreciate over time. Lord i ’s budget
constraint is:
Zit ≡ ψY it + (1− ψ)Y it
Ait + g
i
t
1 +Ait + g
i
t
= cit + pbb
i
t + pgg
i
t, (4)
where pb > 0 represents the costs associated with hiring a soldier and pg > 0 the cost of increasing
24State capacity building fosters economic development by introducing market-supporting institutions, property
rights and judicial systems. Here, for simplicity, the model does not capture this aspect. The introduction of
such a mechanism would generate additional income for Lords that invest in state capacity, rewarding them.
Furthermore, it would provide clear results relating state capacity to economic development through gender
equality. However, this paper indirectly relates the two, although without the reinforcing effect that state capacity
exerts through development.
25Clearly, if there is only one manor it faces no risk of losing any territory due to an attack and its optimal
number of soldiers is zero. However, assuming the externality is ignored, all manors will inevitably hire a positive
number of soldiers and invest in state capacity if financially feasible.
26Introducing labour input through commoners delivers the same qualitative results. Furthermore, allowing
commoners released from productive labour activities to participate in war also yields similar results. In particular,
under the linear specification Y it = n
i
t − bit + xit, where nit are commoners and bit represents those participating in
war, results are qualitatively the same.
27Lords historically used crop-sharing or leases to allocate production, see Slicher van Bath (1966). The burden
supported by peasants varied between 1
2
and 1
3
, depending on land fertility. Duby (1962) and Volokh (2009) find
that share-cropping was more common in continental Europe while leasing was preferred in England.
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state capacity.28 Equation 1 and the budget constraint provide two reasons to invest in state
capacity: first, it contributes positively to the outcome of war and, second, it allows for greater
taxation. Given this, some Lords might invest in state capacity even when facing dynastic
extinction, because tax income can be consumed.
Both the optimal number of soldiers, investment in state capacity and comparative statics
are given in the following Propositions.
Proposition 1. The Lords’ optimal decision is given by the unique triplet
(
cit, b
i
t, g
i
t
)
such that:
bit = B
(
git
)
=
γφ(Y it (ψ +A
i
t + g
i
t)− pbgit(1 +Ait + git))
pb(1 +A
i
t + g
i
t)(1 + γφ)
git = G
(
git
)
= max {0, g|G1 (g) = 0} ,
cit = C
(
bit, g
i
t
)
= Zit − pbbit − pggit,
(5)
where G1
(
git
)
= γ
1+Ait+g
i
t
+
(1+γφ)(pg(1+Ait+git)2−(1−ψ)Y it )
(1+Ait+g
i
t)(pgg
i
t(1+A
i
t+g
i
t)−Y it (ψ+Ait+git))
.
The next Propositions derive the main analytical results. First, Proposition 2 establishes the
relationship between the probability of dynastic continuity, γ, and state capacity building.
Proposition 2. State capacity building increases with the probability of dynastic continuity:
∂git
∂γ ≥ 0.
Corollary 1. Investments in state capacity are positive when dynastic continuity tends to zero if
wealth Y it is large enough, and accumulated state capacity A
i
t is low: limγ→0 git =
Y it (1−ψ)√
pg
−1−Ait.
Proposition 2 indicates that, as the probability of dynastic continuity increases, Lords
optimally allocate more resources to increase state capacity. This relationship is akin to
Proposition 6 in Besley and Persson (2009). Corollary 1 establishes that state-building is
compatible with low likelihood of dynastic continuity. In that case, state capacity serves to
increase tax revenue, which can be used for consumption. Other reasons may compel a Lord
to invest in state capacity. For instance, investments can signal commitment to bureaucrats,
reducing their incentive to revolt, particularly during transitions between Lords. Similarly,
fertility is an endogenous variable that increases the probability of dynastic continuity under
28No payments are required to maintain a certain level of state capacity once it is reached. However, results
do not qualitatively change under a proportional tax farming system. In that case, tax income would be
(1− ψ)(1− ζ)Y it A
i
t+g
i
t
1+Ait+g
i
t
where ζ ∈ (0, 1) represents the proportion of taxes officials keep as payment.
10
male-preference cognatic primogeniture, and Lords may be willing to trade off state capacity
against higher values of γ.29
We will weigh this effect against the indirect effect of more marriages under gender-egalitarian
rules, which entail a lower probability of dynastic continuity. The effect of marriages operates
through land-merging and affects manor sizes and wealth. Proposition 3 establishes that wealth
positively affects state-building, a result familiar from the literature, see Proposition 4 in Besley
and Persson (2009).
Proposition 3. State capacity building increases with wealth:
∂git
∂Y it
≥ 0.
Finally, Proposition 4 presents additional comparative statics.
Proposition 4. At the optimum,
∂bit
∂Y it
> 0,
∂bit
Ait
> 0 and
∂git
Ait
< 0. Also, at the optimum,
∂git
∂ψ ≥ 0,
∂git
∂pb
= 0,
∂git
∂pg
< 0 and
∂git
∂φ < 0. Regarding soldiers, we have that
∂bit
∂γ ≥ 0, ∂b
i
t
∂φ ≥ 0, ∂b
i
t
∂ψ ≥ 0 and
∂bit
∂pb
< 0.
Proposition 4 shows that army size increases in Y it and A
i
t. Moreover, g
i
t also increases with
Y it . However, although g
i
t decreases with its accumulated level, if A
j
t > A
i
t then A
j
t +g
j
t > A
i
t+g
i
t.
Hence, a larger and more developed manor will capture more land from its opponents and, failing
any counterbalancing force, it will continuously expand, creating an empire. Also, Proposition 4
indicates that the optimal number of soldiers decreases with its price. On the other hand, if the
relative importance of soldiers in the war process, measured by φ, increases, the optimal response
is to deploy more, thereby taking advantage of the value they add. Finally, a higher ψ means
that Lords own more resources and depend less on taxation income, although it reduces the
incentive to tax commoners. Since soldiers are a normal good, an increase in income increases
demand for them. Similar reasoning can be applied to git. The negative relationship with φ
follows from the substitutability between soldiers and state capacity.
A crucial aspect of this model is the delicate relationship between gender and surname-
carrying. The surname-carrying gender —male— perpetuates the dynasty and institutions
that favour male inheritance favour state capacity building, because Lords care about dynastic
continuity. This generates the relationship between γ and state capacity in our model. In this
respect, a gender-discriminating inheritance rule only promotes state capacity if heirship and
surnames descend through the same gender. On the other hand, the number of men and women
29Under male-preference cognatic primogeniture, the probability of dynastic continuity equals 1− 0.5Φ, where
Φ denotes the number of children. By increasing fertility, a Lord can partly insure himself against dynastic
extinction.
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on the marriage market for land-inheriting heirs is balanced under a gender-neutral inheritance
rule.30 Consequently, there are more marriages under this rule, and landholdings are merged
more often and become larger.31 This provides an indirect lever that fosters state-building, as
investments increase with Lords’ income.
3.1 Dynamics
Up to now we have restricted our attention to a static problem. This section describes the
dynamic behaviour of the model, significantly influenced by the outcome of the marriage market
and war, which consolidate landholdings. In what follows, we assume that tiny manors resulting
from the war process are integrated into larger entities.32
In the context of the model, decisions are made under uncertainty with respect to dynastic
continuity. In particular, an heir’s gender is only revealed at a testator’s death, and this
announcement is deferred until the Lord’s offspring reaches adulthood.33 Taking this into
consideration, we propose that events unfold in the following manner:34
1. Lords decide cit, b
i
t and g
i
t.
2. War takes place.
3. Heir’s gender is revealed and marriages are arranged.
3.2 Marriages
We consider a marriage market for land-inheriting heirs in which all participants have perfect
information. Prospective spouses sort candidates according to wealth, that is, the preferred
match is the richest individual of the opposite gender. As there are not necessarily the same
number of men and women on this market, unmatched individuals are assumed to marry a
30Men and women are equally likely to inherit under a gender-egalitarian rule. Hence, equal numbers of men
and women inherit land. Gender-biased rules over-represent one gender among land-inheritors and, consequently,
fewer marriages between them can be arranged.
31Such marriages also combined wealth and political power, which we do not incorporate in the model.
32Removing small manors improves the numeric accuracy of the simulations. Indeed, Equation 2 and bit > 0
imply that no manor disappears due to conflict but they become infinitesimally small. At any rate, such tiny
manors would be obliterated by more militarily capable rivals, and removing them is a natural step.
33Marrying an heir to an heiress before the death of her father was a risky business, see Payling (2001).
Arguably, waging war and deciding strategic alliances through pre-marital arrangements entailed a similar risk.
34This particular sequence of events does not allow Lords to enter into treaties based on future marriages.
Although relevant, that strategic aspect is not captured by the model and treaties are concluded in the aftermath
of war. In any case, family bonds per se did not ensure peace among the parties. Charles the Bald’s conflicts with
his brothers and nephew are good examples. Hicks (1998) explores the case of the Neville family, McLaughlin
(1990, p. 199) cites the case of Richilde of Hainaut who fought her brother-in-law and Arnould III of Guˆınes who
battled against his own son.
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non-heir child of a nobleman or a noble from elsewhere in the world. In medieval Europe, the elite
deployed certain marriage strategies for their children: marriages were normally only arranged
between spouses of similar rank.35 We capture this aspect by assuming that only potential
spouses who are similar enough in terms of wealth can marry. In particular, the distance between
them must be below a certain threshold, δt, for them to wed.
36
Under these conditions, spouse selection follows a refined version of Gale and Shapley (1962).
In our case, the outcome is intuitive. A Lord will marry his heir(ess) to the best possible
candidate within his rank. This leads to a swift process of land concentration within the upper
echelons of wealth distribution. Appendix B formalises the marriage market, and we assume
that the state capacity of a merged manor is the average of its constituent parts.
It is important to note that inheritance rules and the stochastic realisation of children’s
gender determine the outcome of the marriage market. In particular, heirs’ gender determines the
number of men and women on the marriage market, and hence the number of possible marriages.
Each inheritance rule incorporates mechanisms that can potentially lead to higher levels of state
capacity. On the one hand, male-preference cognatic primogeniture offers a higher probability
of dynastic continuity, directly encouraging state-building. Under such a rule a woman can
only inherit if she has no living brothers. Therefore, a dynasty survives with a probability of
1 − 0.5Φ for a man with Φ children.37 This is higher than the respective probability under
absolute primogeniture, 0.5, because the latter dictates that the oldest sibling inherits. Hence,
discount rates are such that γM > γA. On the other hand, absolute primogeniture balances
the number of land-inheriting heirs and heiresses. Correspondingly, more land-merging occurs
through marriages, which generates a wealth effect that encourages state-building. Because of
the non-trivial, stochastic behaviour of the model when it comes to heirs’ gender, we resort to
numerical simulations to analyse the implications of different inheritance rules.
35For instance, Bouchard (1981) explains the difficulties of early Capetians in finding suitable queens for their
sons. Hurwich (1998) analyses the marriage pattern of the German lower nobility and finds that men tended to
marry upwards on the social ladder, due to the way children from unequal marriages were treated. In Zeeland,
there are records of marriages between spouses from different strata, but most marriages were arranged between
spouses of similar rank, see van Steensel (2012).
36Alternatively, inheritors can be classified into N > 1 groups according to their wealth. Only marriages
between spouses who belong to the same group would be feasible.
37Introducing endogenous fertility would not change the results for absolute primogeniture, because the
gender of the heir is independent of number of children. However, it would introduce a strategic variable under
male-preference cognatic primogeniture. Assuming a high enough cost of children, only wealthier Lords could
secure dynastic continuity, thereby incentivising them for state-building and giving them an additional advantage
during the war. We conjecture that qualitative results would remain similar, although probably the dynamics of
male-preference cognatic primogeniture would be expedited.
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4 Simulations and Results
At the beginning of each period, 30 manors exist. Simulations follow the steps outlined above,
and we run 1000 simulations for each inheritance rule.
Parametrisation. The value of most of the parameters for the simulations is chosen from
historical sources. The number of children per Lord comes from Russell (1958). French data
show that 4.15 children survived their father. In England, the number was lower: 2.35. We
take 3 as the number of children per Lord. Consequently, the effective discount rates are
γM = 1− 0.5Φ = 1− 0.53 and γA = 0.5.
The crop-sharing rule value is the average of the extreme cases presented in Slicher van
Bath (1966). Therefore, ψ = 5/12. We use Sa´nchez Mart´ınez et al. (2003) and Banegas Lo´pez
(2010) to compute the cost of soldiers, comparing their daily cost (2 sous) with the typical daily
expenditure on food for a nobleman (1.6 sous). The real cost of a soldier is then pb = 1.2.
38
We proceed similarly to compute the cost of taxation. Following Verde´s Pijuan (2004, p. 153),
in the town of Cervera during the year 1424, the racional, that is, an auditor, received no less
than 330 sous39 in yearly wages. A racional had to work three days a week or around 150
days per year, which gives us an equivalent wage of 2.2 sous per day. There is, though, a large
discrepancy between this figure and English references.40 We initially follow the first estimate
and set pg = 1.375.
Finally, for each simulation we draw initial manor sizes
(
xit
)
from a uniform distribution
between 1 and 2 and we set the initial level of state capacity equal to zero. The disappearance
threshold is set at δ = 0.01, that is, one-hundredth of the minimum original size. We use a
time-varying marriage threshold equal to one standard deviation in manor size. The value of φ is
larger than 1 by assumption and equals 1 + 1
1011
, which delivers a slow evolution of the economy
by hampering the effect war has on the distribution of manor sizes. Table 1 summarises the
parametrisation. In the remaining part of this Section, we comment on the results. Unless stated
otherwise, marriages refer to marriages between a land-inheriting heir and heiress. Candidates
on the marriage market are ranked according to the size of their manors.
Results: Figure 1 illustrates the evolution over time of the average level of state capacity
38English soldiers had a similar real cost, as compared to expenditure on nobles’ food, ranging between 0.428
for an archer and 2.57 for cavalrymen. The real cost of infantry was 1.14. Data on expenditures on food for nobles
from Dyer (1989, p. 65) for the year 1380, and on wages from Norman and Pottinger (1979, p. 79).
39The source says they received no less than 30 florins. One florin corresponded to 11 sous.
40Ives (1983, p. 323) reports that a sergeant received £10 per circuit. This figure represents a real cost of 0.93.
The real cost of an ordinary judge is estimated at 4.69. In Dyer (1989, p. 47), the real cost of a lawyer is 2.44.
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Table 1: Parameters.
Parameter Value Source
ψ 5/12 Slicher van Bath (1966)
Φ 3 Russell (1958).
φ 1 + 1/1011 Arbitrarily set to obtain slow transitions.
pb 1.375 Banegas Lo´pez (2010) and Sa´nchez Mart´ınez et al. (2003).
pg 1.2 Banegas Lo´pez (2010) and Verde´s Pijuan (2004).
γM 7/8 γM = 1− 0.5Φ.
γA 1/2 γA = 1− 0.5.
δ 0.01 Arbitrarily set to 1/100 of the minimum initial size.
for each inheritance rule. The solid line corresponds to male-preference cognatic primogeniture
and the dashed line to absolute primogeniture.
Simulations provide evidence that, in the long run, a gender-biased inheritance rule allows
higher average levels of state capacity to be achieved. However, it is also clear that, in the short
run, gender-egalitarian rules boost state capacity more. This supports the previous intuition on
the importance of marriages in merging manors and the significance of the income effect. In that
sense, even if γ is lower under absolute primogeniture, wealth accumulation through marriages
more than compensates for it.41 The subsequent reversal occurs because, in the long run, land
is also concentrated through marriages under male-preference cognatic primogeniture, albeit at
a slower rate. Thus, how long the rules apply is crucial in determining which of them is best,
and the direct effect of dynastic continuity only dominates when the distribution of manor sizes
is similar enough between regimes.
As stated, marriages between heirs are a decisive factor in shaping the evolution of state
capacity. When there are no restrictions on the marriage market, the marriage rate —that is,
the total number of actual marriages relative to the number of participants in the market— is
higher under absolute primogeniture.42 Our simulations show marriage rates of 0.41 and 0.125
for absolute and male-preference cognatic primogeniture respectively during the first period,
when the number of participants is largest and δ is less binding. Regional unification through
marriage occurs faster initially under absolute primogeniture, generating larger manors that
41Wealth also accumulates through war, but its outcome is similar for both regimes.
42This follows from the fact that under this rule, the probability of observing a land-inheriting heir equals the
probability of observing a land-inheriting heiress: absolute primogeniture means that the oldest sibling inherits. In
contrast, under male-preference cognatic primogeniture, there are more land-inheriting sons than land-inheriting
daughters. Consequently, few land-merging marriages can be arranged. Younger brothers seek an heiress to
marry or enter alternative occupations, see Appendix A and footnote 13. When the number of participants
in the marriage market tends to infinity, the ratio of marriages to participants approaches 0.5 under absolute
primogeniture and 0.125 under male-preference cognatic primogeniture.
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Figure 1: Average state capacity.
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Note: This Figure represents average levels of state capacity reached in the simulations for each period,
distinguishing between inheritance rules. The solid line corresponds to male-preference cognatic primogeniture
and the dashed line to absolute primogeniture.
invest more in developing state capacity. This explains why this inheritance rule is associated
with greater average state capacity in the short run.
On the other hand, a gender-biased rule promotes state capacity through the direct effect of
γ. Although initially, average manor size is smaller due to fewer marriages, the manors large
enough to build state capacity are of similar size under both rules. Figure 2a confirms this
is the case, especially from period five onward. In these cases, γM > γA coupled with similar
manor size results in higher average spending on state-building under male-preference cognatic
primogeniture. Figure 2b depicts average expenditure on building state capacity when only Lords
investing a positive amount of resources are considered. Note that male-preference cognatic
primogeniture overtakes absolute primogeniture even before manor size equalises, suggesting
that the political stability conferred by dynastic continuity is a powerful driver of state-building.
Finally, Figure 2c presents the percentage of Lords that invest in state-building. Again, when
manors are similar in size, not only do Lords invest more under male-preference cognatic
primogeniture, but also more Lords invest.
All in all, our simulations indicate that a higher probability of dynastic continuity does not
guarantee higher levels of state capacity in the short run, once richer dynamics —inter-state
marriages— are incorporated in the model. Nonetheless, in the long run, the importance of
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Figure 2: Evolution of Y and investments.
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(b) Avg. investment of investors.
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(c) % that invest.
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Note: This Figure presents the average evolution of several variables. Panel A) depicts the average manor
size of manors that build state capacity. Panel B) shows the average expenditure in state-building for the
cases with positive investments. Finally, Panel C) presents the percentage of Lords that devote resources to
state-building.
dynastic continuity re-emerges because income differences vanish with time. The number of
marriages is limited and, eventually, a gender-discriminating rule catches up.43
Sensitivity analysis. Given the variations present in the estimates of the parameters,
especially pg, we diligently conduct a series of robustness tests. In a first approach, we modify
the value of the parameters one at a time. In all cases, the main result holds, that is, absolute
primogeniture delivers higher levels of state capacity in the short run, only to be outperformed
by male-preference cognatic primogeniture in the long run.
However, the dynamics are impacted, and the point at which male-preference cognatic
primogeniture begins to outperform absolute primogeniture depends on the exact value of the
parameters. We explore the relationship between the different parameters and this turning point
43In that sense, the model predicts regional unification as manors merge. Appendix E explores two cases of
late unification in the European context and proposes amendments to reconcile the model with these cases.
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in the relative performance of the two inheritance rules. In particular, starting from the baseline
parametrisation in Table 1, we allow one parameter to take on different values while holding the
rest at their baseline level. For each combination, we run one hundred simulations. Finally, we
compute the average time at which male-preference cognatic primogeniture lastingly overtakes
absolute primogeniture. Figure 3 presents the results. The horizontal axis represents the value of
the parameter we change. The vertical axis indicates the average time at which male-preference
cognatic primogeniture begins to deliver greater average state capacity. Notice that parameters
vary over a relatively large interval.
First, we focus on the effect of pg. Figure 3a indicates that increasing pg tends to slow down
the process. In fact, the entire evolution of state capacity is delayed because investments are now
more costly. However, the slowdown is more salient for male-preference cognatic primogeniture.
This hints at the importance of the marriage market in generating manors that are wealthy
enough to invest in state-building. Indeed, as pg rises, the wealth threshold that determines
investment in state capacity does so as well.
Second, values for pb are changed and the rest held at their baseline level. Figure 3b displays
the results of this exercise. In general, no clear pattern emerges, and the spread of timing of
male-preference cognatic primogeniture outperformance is tight. This is because the contribution
of war toward wealth accumulation is similar under both norms. In particular, although Lords
devote less resources to the army, the reduction is similar for all of them. Hence, the outcome of
war is akin to that of the baseline case, as is the evolution of state capacity.
We continue by analysing the effect of φ, measuring men’s effect on war outcomes. The
results are shown in Figure 3c. If φ increases, deploying marginally more soldiers contributes
more than linearly to the outcome of war —as long as φ > 1—. Hence, for a given difference
in army size, higher values of φ imply widening differences in the outcome. Therefore, as φ
grows, Lords that have vanquished neighbours appropriate more land from them. This speeds
up wealth accumulation and, consequently, male-preference cognatic primogeniture reaches the
threshold determining investment in state capacity faster.
The effect ψ has on the reversal of outperformance between absolute primogeniture and
male-preference cognatic primogeniture is negative, as Figure 3d reveals. The overall influence
of ψ is twofold. On the one hand, a higher value means that Lords appropriate a larger share of
output and rely less on taxation, which negatively impacts state-building. On the other hand,
Lords are wealthier because they receive more output. The reversal clearly occurs later as ψ
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increases. Taken together, the reduced incentive to invest in state capacity dominates the wealth
effect. In other words, the reduction in the marginal return on state capacity means that only
wealthy Lords invest, and Lords are in general wealthier under absolute primogeniture.
Finally, we analyse the effect of changing Lords’ progeny, Φ, in Figure 3e. As noted previously,
this has no effect under absolute primogeniture, as the heir is always the first-born and hence
the discount rate γA remains constant at 0.5. However, γM = 1 − 0.5Φ and its exact value
increases with Lords’ offspring, directly boosting state capacity. Nonetheless, a higher value
of Φ also reduces the probability that there will be an heiress under male-preference cognatic
primogeniture —it equals 0.5Φ—. As a consequence, the process of land accumulation through
marriages is severely hindered. Simulations give mixed results. The direct effect is stronger
at low levels of Φ, when γM rises more rapidly, as illustrated by the initial drop shown on the
graph. However, despite a higher direct incentive, simulations indicate that the more offspring
Lords have, the longer it takes male-preference cognatic primogeniture to outperform absolute
primogeniture.
5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the evolution of state capacity at its early stages, focusing on the European
medieval period. It shows that gender equality regarding access to inheritance affects the
evolution of state capacity among nascent states during that time. Departing from the literature,
it introduces inheritance rules and inter-state marriages in a simple theoretical model of state-
building. The paper argues that the degree of gender-egalitarianism embedded in inheritance
rules affects the development of state capacity. Two mechanisms are at play. First, the surname-
carrying gender —typically male— ensures dynastic continuity. Institutions that favour male
inheritance incentivise investments in state capacity because the nobility cares about dynastic
continuity. Second, there is an indirect effect of more land-merging marriages under gender-
egalitarian rules, which boosts income and encourages larger investments in state capacity. The
role of dynastic continuity is often highlighted in the literature, but the second mechanism has
been neglected. However, our analysis concerns only the historical evolution of state capacity
and does not shed light on how modern states may build it.
Our results revise the importance of dynastic continuity, indicating that time considerations
are relevant as well. In particular, gender-egalitarian rules —offering a lower probability of
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dynastic continuity— deliver higher levels of state capacity in the short run. However, this lead
is only temporary: land-merging marriages take place under gender-discriminating rules, only
the pace is slower. Since the number of possible marriages is finite, gender-biased rules catch
up, landholdings become of similar size and the direct effect dominates. In addition to land,
marriages can also merge wealth and political power, leading to a broader interpretation of the
effects of inheritance rules, not confined to territorial-based states. Finally, in the light of the
evidence relating state capacity and development, our results indicate that gender equality in
inheritance rules indirectly affects the latter through the process of state-building.
The paper provides a rationale for the pervasive use of male-favouring inheritance rules in
the European medieval context that goes beyond dynastic continuity: such rules also generate
higher levels of state capacity. Despite the fact that European regions historically favoured men,
precluding cross-country comparisons, our work still delivers some testable implications regarding
state-building. First, the model indicates that regions where more marriages occurred were
likely to develop state capacity more. Second, nobles who were fortunate enough to have a clear
male, dynasty-continuing succession were likely to invest more resources in advancing the state.
Finally, the importance of inter-state marriages was probably greater for small, high-capacity
states not pursuing territorial expansion. These outcomes can be empirically tested.
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A Historical background
A.1 Feudalism and primogeniture
According to Reynolds (1996), under the feudal system first introduced by Carolingian rulers,
lords were to “protect and maintain” vassals in exchange for military aid and court counselling
in a society with no central government. This exchange involved transferring the control of fiefs
from lords to vassals, to provide the latter with income to support their duties. Initially, this
was only a lifetime arrangement, but its transmission through inheritance soon became common,
and was already accepted for some domains as early as 877 in France and 1037 in Germany and
Italy.
The military origins of fiefdom and the financial burden vassal obligations represented explain
the prevalence of primogeniture, as “continual subdivision of and parcelling out of military
tenures was a source of weakness to the organisation for the defence of the kingdom” (Cecil (1895,
p. 31)). For such reasons, William I of England and Frederick Barbarossa declared honorary
fiefs carrying duties indivisible, while King Edward I of England acknowledged that “undivided
[lands] are quite sufficient for the service of the state [... but once] divided [...] no one portion
suffices even for its owner’s maintenance”, see Willian Searle (1902, p. 174).
The importance of preserving estates complete is best exemplified by the practices employed.
Noblemen generally had a large progeny to ensure dynastic continuity. However, some families
forced up to 40% of their sons to remain single to avoid estate division, apparently jeopardising
their direct genetic success, see Debris (2005, p. 24-26) and Hurwich (1998). Moreover,
primogeniture ensured the economic success of only one son. Blocking the immediate transmission
of genetic material or selecting a sole heir may seem counterproductive arrangements for the long-
term diffusion of genetic material. However, Hrdy and Judge (1993) indicate these may be optimal
in land-based societies.44 In particular, the authors argue that, if wealth determines marriage
prospects, then bestowing land to a sole heir increases the probability of producing a grandson. In
that sense, strategies that prevent estate division focus on the long-term survival of the dynasty:
“unequal treatment of heirs was a strategy to minimize the probability of dying without surviving
grandchildren”. Bergstrom (1994) reasons similarly and argues that keeping inheritances intact
increased elite members’ fitness. Focusing on the aristocracy, Voland and Dunbar (1995) note
that restraining fertility enhanced the heir’s fitness when the intertemporal preservation of
44Hrdy and Judge (1993) are concerned about farmer families. However, the survival of elite members also
depended on landholding size, as discussed above.
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status and lineage survival mattered. Chu (1991) offers a theoretical model focusing on this
quality-quantity trade-off whereby primogeniture emerges as the optimal inheritance rule to
avoid dynastic extinction.
Observers relate the cost of privately providing security to fief indivisibility. In fact, “the
security of a landed estate depended upon its greatness”, whereas estate division would “ruin it”
by easing “incursions of its neighbours”, see Smith (1776). Blackstone (1766, p. 215) reasons
similarly, adding that younger brothers were encouraged by the system to enter alternative
occupations: the military, mercantile, civil and ecclesiastical positions, see also Betzig (1995) and
Debris (2005, p. 24-25). The practice of fief indivisibility, particularly through primogeniture,
better protected landownership against external attacks by selecting the eldest and most able
son to inherit the responsibility of organising the defence, see Brenner (1985). However, external
security came at the cost of internal instability caused by quarrels between siblings, see Bloch
(1989, p. 134-135) and Duby (1983, p. 93-94).
Despite the general prevalence of primogeniture, estate division was a common practice
during the early medieval times, and was gradually abandoned. Partition may have been an
optimal system in earlier times, particularly if the cost of privately providing security and
defence increased over time. In that sense, the shift in inheritance rules may reflect technological
changes. Alternatively, agency problems in managing large estates could explain the adoption of
inheritance division. In any case, ancient British custom dictated that all sons should share any
inheritance, and in some regions women were also allowed to inherit (Cecil (1895, p. 26-27) and
Patourel (1971)). The Saxons, however, represent a notable exception: typically, the eldest son
was sole heir. William the Conqueror imported the Norman tradition of primogeniture, imposing
it on military tenures. Other landholdings followed suit. Finally, around the 13th century in
England, daughters shared an inheritance as co-heiresses if they had no living brothers, according
to Brenner (1985). The author argues that dividing the inheritance avoided conflict between the
husbands of the sisters. This was the case in the Marshal and Peverel families, see Leyser (2013,
p. 119) and Ward (1995, p. 101). However, estate division was partly counteracted by sending
younger daughters into monastic life, see Ward (1995, p. 21-22).
Transition from partitioning to intact inheritances occurred in French territories under the
Capetian dynasty. Bloch (1961, p. 197) date the beginning of dynastic inheritance at around
the year 1000 in Anjou and 1066 in Normandy, from where it reached the British Isles. Outside
the common pattern, there were cases of divided inheritances: Evergates (2011) gives some
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examples in the province of Champagne between 1100 and 1300 and Barlow (1983) explains the
process that culminated in the division of William the Conqueror’s possessions between his two
eldest sons. Germanic tradition, however, varied over time. Inheritance was first established
in 1037 by King Conrad II, who stated that land should descend to the son. The new ruling
initially applied to Italian landholdings, but was subsequently introduced in Germany. It reached
Carinthia, Swabia and Holland by the 12th century, unifying inheritance rules throughout the
Empire. However, during the 13th century German princes embraced partitioning to exercise
their power in opposition to the emperor. Primogeniture was restored as the inheritance rule
after the Thirty Years War.
A.2 Women’s access to inheritance
A second aspect related to inheritance rules concerns the treatment of women. According to
Herlihy (1962), barriers to female inheritance of land were first introduced by the Salic Law. This
law completely banned women from inheriting land and brought about arguments and difficulties
in identifying the proper heir. Barring women was aligned with the Germanic tribes’ customs, see
Klapisch-Zuber et al. (1994, p. 171). King Chilperic relaxed the requirement and allowed women
to inherit in the same way as men if all the surviving offspring were daughters. Other codes of
law mutated as well, partly allowing women to inherit. For instance, Visigothic laws equally
divided inheritances among all children in the case of intestate succession (Klapisch-Zuber et al.
(1994, p. 177)). However, under several German codes, male preference was observed: Norman
(Patourel (1971), Jewell (1996)), Chamavian, Thuringian, Saxon and Lombard (Nelson and Rio
(2013) and Klapisch-Zuber et al. (1994, p. 177)) and Visigothic in Catalonia (Ros (2012) and
Piniella del Valle (1986)).
In general, scholars advance the importance of defence to explain the rise of primogeniture
and the exclusion of women. Bloch (1961, p. 200) relate the ubiquitous male preference in
inheritance rules to military duties and Brenner (1985) reasons similarly. In fact, the core of the
feudal system consisted in the exchange of means of maintenance for military aid, where men
had a comparative advantage. However, inheritance rules usually did not completely exclude
women from succession. Whenever a daughter inherited a landed estate, marriage customs took
care of the seeming contradiction of a woman in charge of armies. Husbands took over the
responsibility attached to the fiefdom, including wealth management, see Drell (2013). However,
decision-making reverted to husbands as well, giving an impetus and incentive to younger sons
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to search for heiresses to marry and thus become part of the landed elite. In that sense, Holt
(1985) indicates that an heiress “brought land to husband and ultimately to children” through
inheritance. Marriages between inheritors from different countries were commonly used during
the middle ages to increase estate size, see Habakkuk (1950), Clay (1968) and Girouard (1978).
According to Brenner (1985), population density reduced the benefits of primogeniture as
interactions between individuals became more frequent and complex. The state replaced kinship
in providing protection and law enforcement. Hence, the incentive to maintain large landholdings
to provide expensive services reduced. English landlords were allowed to freely distribute land
—with some restrictions— in 1540, and this was further extended in 1597. Similarly, Burgundy,
Orle´ans and Moulins eased estate division around the same time. However, advances in terms of
gender equality were slower. French revolutionaries introduced gender equality in inheritance
during 1791, although the law was repealed during the First Empire. Nordic countries passed
laws introducing equality during the second half of the 19th century, while Italy incorporated it
in 1865. Succession to the throne of England and Scotland followed male-preference cognatic
primogeniture until 2013, when it was changed to absolute primogeniture. However, the peerage
still follows male-preference cognatic primogeniture. Other European kingdoms followed a similar
transition during the 20th century: Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Denmark and
Luxembourg, moving away from a male-preferential treatment into absolute primogeniture. The
institution of male-preference cognatic primogeniture still survives in Monegasque and Spanish
royal succession laws.
B The Marriage Market
On the marriage market, potential spouses sort candidates according to their wealth. Formally,
let Mt ⊂ Lt be the set of manors that have a male heir and Ft ⊂ Lt be the set of manors that
have a female heiress before marriages are arranged. Let Ψ (·) measure the relevant variable
that determines marriages —for instance, wealth—, D (i, k) measure the distance between two
potential spouses and let dt > 0 be the threshold value during period t. Finally, let µ
i,k
t = 1 if
there is a marriage between the male heir of manor i ∈ Mt and the female heiress of manor
k ∈ Ft, and µi,kt = 0 otherwise. The outcome of the marriage market is summarised in the
following Proposition:
Proposition 5. The marriage market outcome described above is given by a set of µi,kt = {0, 1}
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denoting marriages between heir i and heiress k such that aggregate valuations are maximised,
each potential partner marries at most once or remains single and potential partners that marry
are similar:
µi,kt = arg max
µi,kt
∑
i
∑
k
(Ψ (i) + Ψ (k))2 µi,kt ,
such that ∀i ∈Mt, ∀k ∈ Ft µi,kt = {0, 1} ,
∑
k µ
i,k
t ≤ 1,
∑
i µ
i,k
t ≤ 1,
µi,kt D (i, k) ≤ dt,
∑
i
∑
k µ
i,k
t = min {|Mt| , |Ft|} .
Proposition 5 deserves some comments. First, the valuation for any given candidate is
common to all potential partners. Equal valuation and functional super-modularity generate
positive assortativeness. Constraints indicate that each potential couple is either married or not,
individuals can only marry once, spouses must be close enough to marry and the total number
of marriages equals the number of heirs or heiresses, whichever is smaller.
C Country Unification
D Country Unification
The model and the simulations predict, in general, a decrease in the number of manors over time.
This holds true for countries like the present-day United Kingdom or France, which emerged as
unified entities early. However, other regions like northern Italy and Germany witnessed a later
process of unification, remaining fragmented for centuries, especially compared to neighbouring
regions. This Section amends the model to reconcile it with the specific patterns observed in
different regions.
Medieval northern Italy was formed by independent city-states ruled by local elites during
the high and late middle ages. Conflicts among elites over control of a city were common and
involved the use of violence, see Martines (1968). According to Hughes (1975, p. 7), medieval
Genoa operated under “a system of long-lasting alliance within lineages and enmity between
them [which] gave pattern to the seemingly pointless warfare played out on the streets of medieval
Genoa and in its contado”. Lansing (2014) explains the case of Florence, where competition
among lineages for the control of neighbourhoods was common and none achieved long-lasting
supremacy. Similar conflicts arose in Venice, although according to Greif (1995), Venetians
managed to reduce inter-clan tension through the mechanism they devised to choose the Doge.
Remarkably, the city of Siena had to call Florence to help put an end to an internal riot between
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the Tolomei and Salimbeni families (Bowsky (1981, p. 166)). Finally, Jones (1965) also considers
clan structures as a crucial aspect of the Italian middle ages: a clan acted together in all activities,
especially for its defence.
From this evidence, we can presume that elites focused on gaining influence in their city.
From the point of view of the model, we can associate a city-state with region L. Similarly,
former manors can be represented by clans. The marriage market will show friction as well,
since opposing clans’ heirs were not allowed to marry. Suppose that clans have similar initial
conditions in terms of income Y . According to the model, there will be minor changes in the
distribution of wealth over time, as all clans will make similar war efforts. We can also expect
similar marriages to be arranged within each opposing group. Thus, unification will be a lengthy
process. The general model can be modified to accommodate clan rivalry on the marriage market
by defining N > 1 groups and assuming that marriages can only be arranged within each of
these groups.
The Holy Roman Empire —the closest equivalent to Germany— presents a substantially
different case. It was not a single country like France or England, but consisted of several
principalities, duchies, counties and Free Imperial Cities, each ruled by a prince who enjoyed a
large degree of autonomy. The Emperor’s succession was also different, insofar as the Holy Roman
Empire elected the Emperor from its princes, instead of relying on some form of inheritance.
To be elected as Emperor, a prince would have to convince his peers, usually through promises
to grant them more rights. Therefore, the Emperor himself wielded little power within the
empire in terms of capacity to intervene in state affairs, even lacking an imperial tax-system.45
Moreover, Holy Roman Empire princes practised partitioned inheritance, dividing the land
among sons.46 These characteristics can be replicated in the model by setting γ = 0, that
is, certainty for a prince that his lineage will not rule in the next period. Accordingly, no
investment in state-building or in the army is expected. This is partly consistent with reality:
the Empire lacked an imperial tax-system and Ertman (1997, p. 237) indicates that only in 1450
did it begin building an administration as a response to outside pressure. γ = 0 also mean no
military conquests. Indeed, inheritance —the Kingdom of Burgundy— and marriage —Italy—
represented the largest territorial expansion mechanisms for the Empire. Lack of military growth
45An Emperor’s revenue originated in the lands he controlled as a prince, a reason for which Johanek concludes
that “the emperor was not really in a position to govern the Empire” (Hansen (2000, p. 295)).
46The secular elector princes were forced to practise primogeniture to avoid land division, beginning from the
Golden Bull of 1356, see Whaley (2012, p. 27).
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is consistent with the organisation of the Empire, since neither the Emperor nor princes would
have benefited from it: conquered lands would have been introduced as new states.
Despite the fact that the Empire as a whole only began to build a state relatively late, its
princes were more willing to do so, see (Evans and Wilson, 2011, Ch. 4). A more efficient
bureaucratic apparatus increased tax revenues that could then be used to raise an army. This
was especially true for Savoy and Brandenburg, which tried to expand at the expense of
weak neighbours. In the end, lack of unification through marriages between state heirs was a
consequence of the inheritance policy. If the number of heirs exceeds two, marriages cannot
counteract the multiplication of territorial units caused by partitioned inheritances. An additional
feature of inheritances in the Holy Roman Empire was that they were calculated to avoid entailing
to daughters, which exacerbated the effect by over-representing men on the marriage market.
E Country Unification
The model and the simulations predict, in general, a decrease in the number of manors over time.
This holds true for countries like the present-day United Kingdom or France, which emerged as
unified entities early. However, other regions like northern Italy and Germany witnessed a later
process of unification, remaining fragmented for centuries, especially compared to neighbouring
regions. This Section amends the model to reconcile it with the specific patterns observed in
different regions.
Medieval northern Italy was formed by independent city-states ruled by local elites during
the high and late middle ages. Conflicts among elites over control of a city were common and
involved the use of violence, see Martines (1968). According to Hughes (1975, p. 7), medieval
Genoa operated under “a system of long-lasting alliance within lineages and enmity between
them [which] gave pattern to the seemingly pointless warfare played out on the streets of medieval
Genoa and in its contado”. Lansing (2014) explains the case of Florence, where competition
among lineages for the control of neighbourhoods was common and none achieved long-lasting
supremacy. Similar conflicts arose in Venice, although according to Greif (1995), Venetians
managed to reduce inter-clan tension through the mechanism they devised to choose the Doge.
Remarkably, the city of Siena had to call Florence to help put an end to an internal riot between
the Tolomei and Salimbeni families (Bowsky (1981, p. 166)). Finally, Jones (1965) also considers
clan structures as a crucial aspect of the Italian middle ages: a clan acted together in all activities,
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especially for its defence.
From this evidence, we can presume that elites focused on gaining influence in their city.
From the point of view of the model, we can associate a city-state with region L. Similarly,
former manors can be represented by clans. The marriage market will show friction as well,
since opposing clans’ heirs were not allowed to marry. Suppose that clans have similar initial
conditions in terms of income Y . According to the model, there will be minor changes in the
distribution of wealth over time, as all clans will make similar war efforts. We can also expect
similar marriages to be arranged within each opposing group. Thus, unification will be a lengthy
process. The general model can be modified to accommodate clan rivalry on the marriage market
by defining N > 1 groups and assuming that marriages can only be arranged within each of
these groups.
The Holy Roman Empire —the closest equivalent to Germany— presents a substantially
different case. It was not a single country like France or England, but consisted of several
principalities, duchies, counties and Free Imperial Cities, each ruled by a prince who enjoyed a
large degree of autonomy. The Emperor’s succession was also different, insofar as the Holy Roman
Empire elected the Emperor from its princes, instead of relying on some form of inheritance.
To be elected as Emperor, a prince would have to convince his peers, usually through promises
to grant them more rights. Therefore, the Emperor himself wielded little power within the
empire in terms of capacity to intervene in state affairs, even lacking an imperial tax-system.47
Moreover, Holy Roman Empire princes practised partitioned inheritance, dividing the land
among sons.48 These characteristics can be replicated in the model by setting γ = 0, that
is, certainty for a prince that his lineage will not rule in the next period. Accordingly, no
investment in state-building or in the army is expected. This is partly consistent with reality:
the Empire lacked an imperial tax-system and Ertman (1997, p. 237) indicates that only in 1450
did it begin building an administration as a response to outside pressure. γ = 0 also mean no
military conquests. Indeed, inheritance —the Kingdom of Burgundy— and marriage —Italy—
represented the largest territorial expansion mechanisms for the Empire. Lack of military growth
is consistent with the organisation of the Empire, since neither the Emperor nor princes would
have benefited from it: conquered lands would have been introduced as new states.
47An Emperor’s revenue originated in the lands he controlled as a prince, a reason for which Johanek concludes
that “the emperor was not really in a position to govern the Empire” (Hansen (2000, p. 295)).
48The secular elector princes were forced to practise primogeniture to avoid land division, beginning from the
Golden Bull of 1356, see Whaley (2012, p. 27).
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Despite the fact that the Empire as a whole only began to build a state relatively late, its
princes were more willing to do so, see (Evans and Wilson, 2011, Ch. 4). A more efficient
bureaucratic apparatus increased tax revenues that could then be used to raise an army. This
was especially true for Savoy and Brandenburg, which tried to expand at the expense of
weak neighbours. In the end, lack of unification through marriages between state heirs was a
consequence of the inheritance policy. If the number of heirs exceeds two, marriages cannot
counteract the multiplication of territorial units caused by partitioned inheritances. An additional
feature of inheritances in the Holy Roman Empire was that they were calculated to avoid entailing
to daughters, which exacerbated the effect by over-representing men on the marriage market.
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Figure 3: Timing of male-preference cognatic primogeniture take-over.
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Note: This Figure represents the time at which male-preference cognatic primogeniture overtakes absolute
primogeniture in terms of average state capacity for different values of the parameters. Panel A) modifies the
cost of building state capacity, pg. Panel B) changes the cost an army, pb while Panel C) focuses on the effect
soldiers have for the outcome of war, φ. Panel D) varies the share of output Lords appropriate, ψ. Finally,
Panel E) alters Lords’ offspring.
37
